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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 5 - VENUE
Federal venue statute regarding national banking associations
deemed controlling.
Do the general venue provisions of the CPLR apply to
national banking associations? A recent New York supreme court
case 7 9 has indicated that in an action against a national banking
association, venue must be laid in the county where the bank is
established. Hence, the general venue provision of the CPLR 0
which allows a plaintiff to commence an action in the county
where he or the defendant resides is inapplicable. The New York
court deemed itself bound by a recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court 8' which construed the federal venue statute
governing actions against national banks as being mandatory 2
Thus, it was held that the defendant bank could compel a change
of venue from Sullivan County, where it had neither an office
nor a branch, to Nassau County, the location of its established
office. In giving the federal venue statute a mandatory reading,
the court settled the prior division of authority 83 on the question
in New York.
ARTICLE 10- PARTIES GENERALLY
CPLR 1006: Use of interpleader does not preclude jury trial.
When an individual is faced with two or more related claims,
he may have recourse to interpleader,84 an equitable procedure
79 Blank v. Meadow Brook Natl Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 448, 254 N.Y.S.2d
56 (Sup. Ct 1964).
80 CPLR 503(a).
81 Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
82 "Venue of suits. Actions and proceedings against any association
under this chapter may be had . . . in any State, county, or municipal court
in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction
in similar cases." 13 Stat. 108 (1864), as amended, 18 Stat. 320 (1875), 12
U.S.C. §94 (1958).
83 Compare Talmadge v. Third Nat'l Bank, 91 N.Y. 531 (1883) (statute
held permissive), and Chaffee v. Glens Falls Natl Bank & Trust Co., 204
Misc. 181, 123 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Sup. Ct 1953), aff'd mere., 283 App. Div.
694, 128 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1st Dep't 1954) (statute held permissive), with
Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 198 Misc. 312, 96 N.Y.S2d 638 (Sup.
Ct. 1950) (statute held mandatory), and Crofoot v. Giannini, 196 Misc. 213,
92 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (statute held mandatory), and Raiola v.
Los Angeles First Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 133 Misc. 630, 233 N.Y. Supp.
301 (N.Y. City Ct. 1929) (statute held mandatory).
84CPLR 1006. See generally Frumer, On Revising the New York
Interpleader Statutes, 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 737 (1950); Comment, 39 TEXAS
L. Rrv. 632 (1961).
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designed to avoid dual liability, 5 and multiplicity of litigation. 6
In the typical instance, the party concedes liability but is uncertain
to whom payment should be made. He may commence an action
against all prospective claimants 87 or, having himself been named
a defendant, he may join other claimants by service of all prior
pleadings in the action.88
An example of true interpleader is where two or more parties
claim the proceeds of an insurance policy. The insurance company,
the stakeholder, may be hesitant to pay any one of the claimants,
fearing that at a later date it may be determined that it had acted
wrongly and thus remain liable under the policy. The stakeholder
may deposit the proceeds of the policy, the fund, with the court
which would adjudicate the conflicting rights to the fund.
It has been held that such proceedings are purely equitable
since the adversary claimants would have had no legal remedy
as against each other, and therefore no right to a jury trial.8 9
The problem arose in Geddes v. Rosen 90 whether the use
of interpleader by the original defendant in and of itself precluded
both him and the interpleaded defendant from demanding a jury
trial. Plaintiff had entered into a contract with one McEvoy
whereby plaintiff was to be paid one-third the purchase price of
certain corporate assets. The agreement provided that Rosen
would hold the money in escrow and make payments to plaintiff
up to a specified maximum. Geddes, claiming he had not been
fully paid, brought an action against Rosen who interpleaded
McEvoy. McEvoy set up as defenses to the contract, full pay-
ment, estoppel and accord and satisfaction. Plaintiff then filed
a note of issue designating the action as an "accounting . . . for
funds held in trust." The appellate division, in granting defendants'
motion to place the action on the general jury calendar, held
that the use of interpleader alone is insufficient to convert a legal
cause of action into an equitable one and thus negate defendants'
right to a jury trial. 91 Also, mere designation of the action by the
plaintiff as an accounting does not change its basic nature from
legal to equitable.
The majority distinguished this situation from true inter-
pleader in that here no unconditional liability for a fixed sum
existed. The action was basically founded upon a contract, the
85Isacowitz v. Isacowitz, 17 Misc. 2d 29, 185 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
86 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Helmus Constr. Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 816, 198 N.Y.S.
2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1960).87 CPLR 1006(a).
88 CPLR 1006(b). Such a procedure is termed "defensive" interpleader.
89 Clark v. Mosher, 107 N.Y. 118, 14 N.E. 96 (1887).9022 App. Div. 2d 394, 255 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1st Dep't 1965).
91 See Keating v. Astor Theatre Corp.-, 277 App. Div. 52, 97 N.Y.S.2d
843 (1st Dep't 1950).
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construction of which was necessary for the determination of the
rights and liabilities of the parties. The court stated that it was
the nature of the cause of action, rather than the form of the
pleadings or the use of interpleader procedure, which determines
whether a cause is legal or equitable, and correspondingly, whether
a jury trial is available.9 2
In a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Breitel concluded that
"proceedings in the nature of interpleader, because of their origin
in equity, do not permit of a right to a jury trial. .. ., 93 Also,
the statutory provision for trial by jury 91 applies, in his opinion,
only to cases where execution may be obtained against the assets
of the judgment debtor. He indicated that this case involved a
definite fund and that general execution thus would not issue
against the escrowee.
The majority opinion appears consonant with the modern
theory of practice and pleadings in a merged system. The basic
reason remaining for distinguishing between legal and equitable
causes of action is to determine whether a trial by jury is available.
In the Geddes decision, a complete contractual default by the
interpleaded defendant would have provided plaintiff with a strictly
legal remedy, i.e., damages for breach of contract. Neither a mere
demand for equitable relief 9 5 nor the use of a purely equitable
procedural device such as interpleader, should serve to deny a
defendant, where otherwise available, the fundamental right to a
jury trial.9
Indemnification between tort-feasors.
It is well established that there can be no indemnification
between active joint tort-feasors, and that where a plaintiff chooses
to sue fewer than all tort-feasors, the defendant against whom
judgment is rendered has no right to recover against the others
unless his negligence was such as will be labeled passive by the
92 See Matter of Garfield, 14 N.Y.2d 251, 200 N.E.2d 196, 251 N.Y.S.2d
7 (1964) discussed in 39 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 150 (1964); Pass v. Kramer,
160 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1954). But see, e.g., Spiro v. Einzinger, 182 Misc.
120, 50 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Levy v. Niklad, 259 App. Div. 54,
18 N.Y.S.2d 105 (2d Dep't 1940); Clearview Gardens First Corp. v. Weis-
man, 206 Misc. 526, 134 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
9 Geddes v. Rosen, 22 App, Div. 2d 394, 401, 255 N.Y.S.2d 585, 592(1st Dep't 1965) (dissenting opinion).
94 CPLR 4101(1).
95 See Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N.Y. 457, 138 N.E. 406 (1923).
96 "The fact that the genesis . . .was in equity does not affect the right
to a trial by jury when . . . used in actions that involve claims that are
legal." 4 WEzn sTEiN, Kom¢ & MmLas, Naw YORK CIVIL PRActicE 14101.02(1964).
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